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ABSTRACT 
The formation of the board of directors has led to the ever growing debate in the area 
of corporate governance in Nigeria. Essentially, there is a growing concern about the 
effectiveness of the board of director to firm performance, This study attempts to 
investigate an empirical study on the influence of board mechanisms on the perceived 
firm performance of listed firm in Nigeria. The underpinning theory of the study is 
rooted in agency theory, supported by three theories of corporate governance such as 
stewardship, resource dependence, and stakeholder theory to increase the 
understanding of the influence of board mechanisms to perceived firm performance. 
The data were collected through proportionate stratified random sampling techniques. 
The questionnaires were sent to the respondents. Out of 476 questionnaires sent, 401 
returned. The number of valid questionnaires is 362. Data were analyzed using partial 
least squares structural equation modeling (PLS-SEM). Empirical findings showed 
that board size, independence non-executive director, CEO duality, female gender 
diversity, board competence, board professional knowledge, and experience were 
positively associated with perceived firm performance. Also, board ethnicity conflict 
was found to be negatively and statistically significantly related to perceived firm 
performance. However, director skills did not show any significant link to perceived 
firm performance. The findings contribute, theoretically to the knowledge of corporate 
governance. In the context of corporate governance, this is the first study that focused 
on the issues of methodological changes by using primary data to investigate the 
influence of board mechanisms on the perceived firm performance of listed firm in 
Nigeria. The findings provide policymakers, stakeholders, and government with a 
better picture of the formation of the board of directors. The study also offers some 
suggestions for future research. 
Keyword: board size, independence non-executive director, CEO duality, board 
diversity, perceived firm performance 
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ABSTRAK 
Pembentukan lembaga pengarah telah menjurus kepada perdebatan yang berterusan 
dalam tadbir-urus korporat di Nigeria. Akhir-akhir ini terdapat keperluan yang 
bertambah terhadap keberkesanan lembaga Pengarah kearah prestasi firma. Kajian 
empirikal ini bertujuan untuk menyiasat pengaruh mekanisme lembaga terhadap 
tanggapan prestasi firma tersenarai awam di Nigeria. Teori asas kajian ini adalah 
berdasarkan kepada teori agensi yang di sokong oleh tiga teori tadbir-urus koperat. 
Teori-teori tersebut ialah teori "stewardship'', '"resource dependence" dan teori 
"stakeholder". Teori-teori ini digunakan untuk menambahkan kefahaman pengaruh 
mekanisma lembaga terhadap tanggapan prestasi firma. Data telah dikutip melalui 
kaedah pensampelan rawak berstrata. Sejumlah 476 soal selidik telah dihantar kepada 
responden. Hanya 401 soal selidik dikembalikan, dan 362 soalselidik sah untuk 
dianalisa dalam kajian ini. Data telah dianalisa menggunakan "partial least squares 
structural equation modeling" (PLS-SEM). Penemuan empirikal menunjukkan saiz 
ahli lembaga, kebebasan lembaga, dualiti "CEO", kepelbagaian jantina, kecekapan 
lembaga, pengetahuan profesional lembaga, dan, pengalaman lembaga mempunyai 
hubung kait yang positif dengan tanggapan prestasi firma. Disamping itu konflik di 
antara lembaga mempunyai hubung kait yang negatif dan secara statistiknya ianya 
signifikan kepada tanggapan prestasi firma. Waiau bagaimanapun kemahiran lembaga 
tidak menunjukkan hubung kait yang signifikan kepada tanggapan prestasi firma. 
Penemuan dari kajian ini telah rnenyurnbang secara teori kepada tadbir urus korporat. 
Dalam tadbir-urus korporat, kajian ini adalah yang pertarna, fokus kepada isu-isu 
perubahan kaedah dengan rnenggunakan data utama untuk mengkaji pengaruh di 
mekanisme lembaga terhadap tanggapan prestasi firma tersenarai awam di Nigeria. 
Penemuan kajian ini menyumbang ke arah pembuat dasar, golongan yang 
berkepentingan, pihak kerajaan, dan gambaran terkini pembentukan lembaga 
pengarah. Kajian ini turut menawarkan beberapa cadangan untuk kajian di masa 
depan. 
Keyword: saiz lembaga, pengarah bebas bukan eksekutif, dualiti CEO, kepelbagaian 
lembaga, tanggapan prestasi firma. 
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1.1 Background of the Study 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODlICTION 
Tne world has uncovered prominent corporate scandals and unexpected corporate failures, 
unprofessional conduct of the chief executive officer and managers that led to a series of 
prestigious corporate failures and protuberant bankruptcies, notably in developing and 
emerging economies. The global financial crisis and economic meltdown began in the 
United States of America followed by the United Kingdom when the global credit market 
came to a halt in July 2007 (Avgouleas, 2008). Avgouleas (2008) states that the crisis 
brewing for a while really started to show its effects in the middle of 2008. Failure of the 
corporate institutions resulted in a freeze of global credit markets which obligatory 
required world interventions and bailout (Adamu, 2009). 
The collapse of the One in Tel 2001, Enron in 2001, HIH insurance, Commerce bank in 
2001; Tyco, World Com, Global Crossing in 2002 respectively, Cooper, in 2003; Marconi 
in 2005; Norther Rock in 2007, Goldman Sachs in 2007, Fanny Mae in 2008, Lehman 
Brothers in 2008 and Freddy Mac in 2008 are among of the examples well cited in the 
corporate governance literature (Adegbite, 2015; Al-matari, 2014; Ehikioya, 2009; 
Harvey Pamburai, Chamisa, Abdulla & Smith, 2015; Lawal, 2012; Rossi, Nerico & 
Capasso, 2015; Samaduzzarnan, Zaman & Quazi, 2015). It has been suggested that the 
scandals at Enron, WorldCom, Qwest, Tyco and other corporate entities in the US resulted 
in a loss of more than USD 7 trillion of investors' funds (Donaldson, 2003; Global Issue, 
2009; Lawal, 2012). The estimated value of the companies that were wound up during the 
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Appendix A 
Pu sat Pengajlan Pengurusan 
Pornlagaan 
SQal(')Qt. Of SVSWESS ~MENT 
Universlti Utara Malaysia 
Survey on the empirical study on the influence of board mechanisms on the 
perceived firm performance of Listed Firms in i'iigeria 
Dear Respondents 
I am a doetoral student at the Sehool of Business Management, University of Utara 
Malaysia. I am conducting a study on the "An empirical study on the influence of 
board mechanisms on tile perceived firm performance of Listed Firms in Nigeria". 
Through this survey, your answers will be helpful in achieving the objective of the 
study. 
Please be assured that all information provided will be treated with high 
confidentiality. The findings will be used solely for academic purposes. I would 
appreciate your kind assistance in completing and submitting the survey questionnaire. 
I hereby furnish you with my contact for any questions or suggestions. Thank you for 
your time. 
Nuhu Mohammed 
Ph.D. Candidate 
School of Business Management (SBM) 
University of Utara Malaysia. 
-60109629620 
mohammed _nuhu@oyagsb.uum.edu.my 
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Associate prof. Dr. Sa'ari Bin Ahmad 
Ph.D. supervisor 
School of Business Management (SBM) 
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PART A: INFORMATION ON RESPONDENT 
Please tick(✓) the appropriate parentheses by choosing one of the following 
statement that suits your opinion: 
I. Gender: Male l Female [ ] 
2. Education: B.Sc [ ] Master [ ] PhD [ ] Others (Specify) ...... 
3. Age: 31-40[] 41-50 [] 51 60 [] 61-Above[] 
4. Position: Chairman [ ] Chairperson [ ] MD/CEO [ ] Director [ ] 
Independent Director [ ] Secretary [ ] Affiiate director (Specify) .......... . 
5. On how many corporate boards of directors do you serve now? 
·······················---····-·-----------·-··············· [ ] boards 
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PART B: STRUCTURAL QUESTIONS 
Please check (✓) the appropriate parentheses or express the extent to which you 
agree or disagree with the given statement by choosing (circling) one of the 
following: 
Section A: Board Size 
(!=Strongly Disagree, 2=Disagree 3=Neutral; 4=Agree 5=Strongly Agree) 
• The board si:,,e of my firm should be larger than I I 
I 
2 3 4 
i 
16. 
12 The size of my board should be smaller than I 6. 1 2 3 4 
3 The size of my board enables understanding of I 2 3 4 
i the operating environments, offers better 
I 
• guidance. 
4 The size of my board enables understanding of I 2 3 4 
the business process. 
5 Significance number of Directors on the board of I 2 3 4 
my firm have relevant experiences about the 
i industries. 
6 My board has directors with experiences in I 2 3 4 
finance or economic areas. 
Section B: Board Independent 
(I =Strongly Disagree, 2=Disagree 3=Neutral; 4=Agree 5=Strongly Agree) 
1 The number of independent non-executive 
directors is higher than executive directors on the i 
• board of my firm. 
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I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
2 Non-executive directors are absolutely 2 3 4 
independent of management in decision-making. 
3 Independent non-executive director has no 2 3 4 
relationships that could influence their 
. independent judgment on strategy 
implementation, codes of behaviour and 
performance. 
4 : Independent directors participate in 2 3 4 
j reviewing/guiding corporate strategic planning 
• and decisions. 
i 
5 ; Independent directors ensure an effective I 2 3 4 
! management system. 
6 I Independent directors follow up on the progress I 2 3 4 
• of board resolutions. 
i 
Section C: CEO Duality 
(!=Strongly Disagree, 2=Disagree 3=Neutral; 4=Agree 5=Strongly Agree) 
I j Separating the CEO from the board chairman I 2 3 4 
• position enhancing firm performance. 
2 Separating the CEO from the board chairman I 2 3 4 
promoting boardroom culture that encourages 
constructive criticism and alternative views . 
• 
! 3 Formal annual evaluation of the board and I 2 3 4 
I 
directors enhancing the effectiveness of the firm. 
• 4 
I 
Formal CEO evaluation by the board improved I 2 3 4 
the firm performance. 
i 
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Is : Given directors better compensation and making 11 
it more linked to firm performance. • 
2 3 4 
I 6 Better disclosure of board activity improved firm 1 2 3 4 
I performance. 
Section D: Board Gender Diversity 
(1 =Strongly Disagree, 2=Disagree 3=Neutral; 4=Agree 5=Strongly Agree) 
1 · The board of my firms consists of at least one 1 2 3 4 
female director. 
· 2 · F male di t o e rec or n our oa s I eren b rdha d'ff t l 2 3 4 
! professional experience than men director. 
• 
i 
13 .Female director on our board has different values 11 2 ' 4 j 
! 
than men. • 
4 Female director women have influenced the way I 2 3 4 
the board reviews and guide corporate business 
strategy on performance. 
5 Female director are equally active in discussions I 2 3 4 
compared to men. 
i 
6 The female director has influenced governance 11 2 0 4 J 
, issues which are considered by the board. 
! i 
Section E: Director Skills 
(1 =Strongly Disagree, 2=Disagree )=Neutral; 4=Agree 5=Strongly Agree) 
· Director Discuss individual professional 
opposing views. 
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2 • Individual Directors give the CEO advice related 2 3 4 
to the personal knowledge, views, and ideas of 
the members of the board. 
: 
3 : Director provides the CEO with special, creative I 2 3 4 
and non-conformist advice. 
4 Director provides personal and individual 1 2 3 4 
preferences in their judgment. 
Section F: Board of Directors Competence 
(l=Strongly Disagree, 2=Disagree 3=Neutral; 4=Agree 5=Strongly Agree) 
1 The board sets a clear organizational priority on 1 2 3 4 
I firm performance activities for the year ahead. 
I 
2 The governing board of my finn delays actions 1 2 3 4 
I until issues become urgent and critical. 
: 
3 : Our governing board tends to focus more on 1 2 3 4 
j current concerns than on preparing for 
• technological changes that would enhance firm 
! 
performance. 
!4 , The board of directors often discusses and 
I initiates where the firm should be headed in short 
I 2 3 4 
i or midterm on firm performance. 
5 I Within the past year, the governing board of my I 2 3 4 
I firm has reviewed the organization's corporate 
i 1 performance for attaining its long-term goals. 
I i 
6 The board discusses and initiates events and I 2 3 4 
I trends in the larger environment that may present 
I specific opportunities for my firm performance. 
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7 The governing board converts unsuccessful 1 2 3 4 
i novel ideas into more creative and innovative 
ones for my firm performance, 
18 When faced with an important issue, the board I 2 3 4 
often arrives at a solution by generating several 
i creative and tested approaches through R&D for 
! 
: my finn performance, 
I 
9 i The board influences the involvement, of 
! 
1 2 3 4 
. employees at all levels in corporate governance 
! 
activities within my firm. 
i 
Section G: Board Professional Knowledge and Experience 
(1 =Strongly Disagree, 2=Disagree 3=Neutral; 4=Agree 5=Strongly Agree) 
1 Board have enough experience to detect • 1 2 3 4 
! problems on directors' involvement in the 
process of fostering corporate governance within 
the firms 
i2 
! 
Board have enough training to detect problems ; 1 2 3 4 
on directors' involvement in the process of 
· fostering corporate govermnce within the firms 
3 Board have expertise sufficient to allow the 1 2 3 4 
board to add value to the quality decision making 
process & ultimately firm performance 
i 
!4 · Board is fully aware of the competitive position 11 2 3 4 
; 
ofmy firm, 
5 Board are well versed in the organizational and 2 3 4 
performance issues ofmy film 
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6 Board are well experienced in the industry 11 2 3 4 
environment in which we operate. 
7 Board has a retreat or special session at least I I 2 3 4 
! 
every two years to examine performance on long 
- time goals. 
8 Initiate directors' involvement in skill I 2 3 4 
transformation and training on individual 
employees' corporate governance capabilities 
: across different segments of my firm. 
.9 Periodically, the board set aside time to learn I 2 3 4 
more about issues facing directors and managers 
performance. 
I 
Section H: Board Ethnicity Conflict 
(I =Strongly Disagree, 2=Disagree 3=Neutral; 4=Agree S=Strongly Agree) 
I Board members are elected or appointed based I 2 3 4 
on ethnicity. 
2 Board conflict improves firm performance. : I 2 3 4 
3 Board conflict exists as a result of difference I 2 3 4 
• ethnicity group. 
I 
4 Ethnicity conflict affects decisions making in I 2 3 4 
the boardroom. 
5 : Ethnicity conflict exists among groups of board l 2 3 4 
members. 
,6 Ethnicity conflict affects various ownership or I I 2 3 4 
stakeholder interests. 
I 
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7 To a large extent, disagreements among board 
members are not resolved during board 
meetings. 
Section I: Firm Performance 
2 3 4 
(I =Strongly Disagree, 2=Disagree 3=Neutral; 4=Agree 5=Strongly Agree) 
I The return on investment has been I 2 3 4 
significantly improving. 
2 The return on assets has been significantly I 2 3 4 
I 
improving. 
•3 The sales growth has been significantly I 2 3 4 
I 
improving. 
•4 The profit growth has been significantly I 2 3 4 
I 
improving. 
• 5 The income on transactions services, fees and 1 2 3 4 
I 
commission have been significantly improving. 
Thank you for participating in this survey. 
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Result 
Variable 
BGDl_l 
BPKE4_1 
BPKE5_1 
BEC2_1 
BEC7_l 
FP!_I 
FP2_1 
FP3_1 
FP4_1 
FP5_1 
Appendix B 
Replacement of Missing Values 
Result Variables 
' 
: Case Number of Non~ 
Missing Values 
N of Replaced N of Valid 
'.\1issing Values First Last Cases Creating Function 
2 I 362 362 MEAN(BGDl,ALL) 
I I 362 362 
il,fEAN(BPKE4,AL 
L) 
2 1 362 362 
MEAN(BPKE5,AL 
L) 
l 1 362 362 MEAN(BEC2,ALL) 
2 l 362 362 MEAN(BEC7,ALL) 
I I 362 362 il,fEAN(FP !,ALL) 
I I 362 362 MEAN(FP2,ALL) 
I I 362 362 MEAN(FP3,ALL) 
21 I 362 362 MEAN(FP4,ALL) 
2i I 362 362 MEAN(FP5,ALL) 
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I Appendix C 
Path Coefficients (Mean, StdeV, T-values) of the Research Model 
I ~~1 f•.l:f;~~.•¥.½~-;~ :~-~·¥'-t~-,-~ :. 
.. standard[ 
. _.,- .. ~.;.., ,, 
✓~}·~•i~J"' ... t.-, 
~figlii~F,.• Sample · . Standarj~~ t· 
I 
·, -, ~~:t::.-:j 
. Mean(M) Deviation t .. (S~;~;jt 
~~-J; 
-Pl!. (9) ·• , . (STDEV) /r 
. •"'" 
., ~-~"''\'K·'-<' __ ,:- . 
. -~" ''"I 0,691003 0,682114 
. :.c<f!tQ',~ d 0.067349 0,067349 10.260071 
I 0,845866 0.847828 0,036654 0.036654 23.076986 ,.~F:Cl<-BE<:;. 0.739853 0.731530 0.046277 0.046277 15.987366 
':»:if ,,; ' '' ,' ; 0.724038 0.723595 0.048416 0.048416 14.954539 ". • .~4,<;;, ~~~l. 
I mr · •:1:8!11E' 0.878432 0.872771 0.025467 0.025467 34.493274 ~-,· '' 
0.570588 0.557657 0.082881 0.082881 6.884422 
I 0.838162 0.837053 0,023453 0.023453 35.738532 0.913083 0.912610 0.011849 0.011849 77.058259 
I 0.539282 0.536802 0.062097 0.062097 8.684550 0.866442 0.864884 0.022227 0.022227 38.981033 
0.721228 0.695583 0.172378 0.172378 4.183991 
I 0.771133 0.753804 0.149611 0.149611 5.154265 
0.772906 0.771109 0.032128 0.032128 24,056863 
I 0.889859 0.890163 0.010643 0.010643 83.613173 
I 0.761315 0.760933 0.032686 0.032686 23.292005 
0.662008 0.652297 0.086640 0.086640 7.640902 
I 0.900010 0.897049 0.030693 0.030693 29.323059 
0.722005 0.71706! 0.069084 0.069084 10.451082 
I 0.711015 0.644560 0,248808 0.248808 2.857685 0.621065 0.486896 0.399225 0.399225 J.555676 
I 0.882658 0.751082 0.312430 0.312430 2.825136 0.922685 0.835698 0.277984 0.277984 3.319199 
I 0.948638 0.842984 0.273024 
0.273024 3.474565 
0.817439 0.818888 0.016203 0.016203 50.450893 
0.764457 0.762136 0.028454 0.028454 26.866420 
I 0.784555 0.781104 0.029036 0.029036 27.020239 
0.738336 0.736767 0.031324 0.031324 23.570888 
I 0.784109 0.785847 0.023442 0.023442 33.449361 
I 
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Appendix D 
Harman's Single-Factor Test 
o a anance • XD ame T t IV ' E I ' d 
Rotation Sums of 
Extraction Sums of Squared Squared 
initial Eigenvalues Loadin s Loadines' 
%of Cumulativ ~,o of Cumulative 
Total Variance e% Total Variance ~,,o Total 
8,860 l 5,277 15.277 8,860 15.277 15.277 8,634 
7,836 13,510 28.786 7.836 13.5IO 28,786 5.734 
6,056 l 0.441 39.228 6.056 10.441 39.228 5,929 
4.619 7,963 47. 191 4.619 7.963 47.191 5.430 
2.925 5.042 52,233 2.925 5,042 52.233 4.855 
2.348 4,049 56,282 2.348 4,049 56,282 4,605 
2.194 3.783 60.065 2.194 3,783 60,065 4.953 
1.880 3.241 63.306 1.880 3.24] 63,306 2,597 
1.631 2,812 66.118 1.631 2.812 66.l 18 4.066 
1.404 2.421 68.539 
1.200 2.068 70.607 
l.106 1.907 72.514 
1.029 1.774 74.287 
,990 1.707 75.994 
.872 1.504 77.498 
,767 1.322 78.820 
,697 1.202 80.022 
.666 Ll48 81.169 
.652 J.124 82.294 
.615 1.060 83.353 
.592 l.020 84,373 
.535 .923 85.296 
.510 ,879 86.175 
.501 .864 87.040 
.477 .823 87.862 
.455 .785 88.647 
.416 .717 89.364 
.406 ,700 90,064 
.380 ,656 90,720 
,368 ,634 91.354 
.348 .599 91.954 
.337 .580 92.534 
.328 .566 93.100 
.316 .545 93.645 
.306 .528 94.173 
,293 .504 94,677 
.280 .482 95,160 
.260 .449 95,608 
,249 .429 96,037 
,233 .402 96.440 
,222 .383 96,823 
.213 ,368 97,190 
,207 .357 97,547 
.199 .343 97,890 
. 183 ,316 98,206 
.173 ,298 98.504 
.163 ,281 98,785 
.153 .263 99,048 
.130 .225 99.273 
.123 .212 99.485 
.117 .202 99,687 
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52 .l09 .!87 99.874 
53 .073 .126 100.000 
54 1.937E-16 3.340E-16 I 00.000 
55 6.630E-17 1.143E-!6 100.000 
56 -l.052E-
-l.814E-
I 00.000 16 16 
57 
-2.234E- -3.851E-
100.000 16 16 
58 -5.226E- -9010E- 100.000 16 16 
Extraction Method: Prmc,pal Component Analys,s. 
a. When components are correlated, sums of squared loadings cannot be added to obtain a total 
variance. 
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